Yemen’s Strategic Boxes by Cline, Lawrence E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive







SMALL WARS JOURNAL 
smallwarsjournal.com
 
Yemen’s Strategic Boxes 
 
Lawrence E. Cline 
 
As happens episodically, Yemen is once more in the news.  The December 2009 raids on al 
Qaida with some level of US support – together with Saudi intervention in the north of Yemen 
and the abortive Delta flight bombing claimed by al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen – 
have  re-emphasized Yemen’s importance in regional and international security. 
 
One problem with much of the analysis of Yemen is that it tends to emphasize the country’s 
impact on external security.  Particularly within the US, the stress has been on al Qaida’s 
operations in and from Yemen.  Although perhaps justified in terms of overall US strategy, this 
limited view of issues within Yemen that affect its internal security can create strategic myopia.  
Ultimately, these broader internal issues are crucial in how well and how willing the government 
of Yemen will cooperate with other countries. 
 
From Sana’a’s perspective, there are three critical ongoing threats to internal security.  Al Qaida 
certainly is one, but the other two – the Houthi uprising in the north and political unrest in the 
south around Aden – probably are viewed with considerably more concern by the Yemen 
government.  Although each threat is significant in its own right, the possibility of overlap 
among them in the future is even more worrisome.  These specific threats are even further 
exacerbated by a long list of broader social, economic, and political stressors, all of which impact 
on Yemen’s capability to respond adequately. 
 
Al Qaida in Yemen 
 
Al Qaida has had a long-standing presence in Yemen.  Sympathizers for jihad pre-dated the 
actual formation of al Qaida, with Yemenis second only to Saudis as members of the 
international brigade in Afghanistan.  The number of Yemeni mujahedeen continuing allegiance 
to al Qaida is unknown, but probably has been substantial.  Some 40 percent of detainees in 
Guantanamo have been from Yemen, with several former Guantanamo detainees returning to al 
Qaida in Yemen.   Also, some released from Saudi rehabilitation programs have entered Yemen 
and have re-joined to al Qaida.  Al Qaida maintained training camps in Yemen until the late 
1990’s.  Although several have been targeted by the Yemen government, it probably would be 
overly optimistic to conclude that training sites have been completely eliminated. 
 
Yemen has been the scene of numerous al Qaida-associated operations.  The term ‘associated’ is 
used since specific claims of responsibility have been episodic.  These operations have included: 
 
¾ October 2000: Attack on USS Cole 
¾ June 2001: Eight arrested for plot to blow up US Embassy 
¾ June 2002:  Accidental explosion killed two al Qaida members; 650 pounds of explosives 
recovered. 
¾ October 2002:  Attack on French oil tanker Limburg  
¾ December 2002:  Three US missionaries killed; unsure if al Qaida responsible.  
¾ July 2007:  Attack on Spanish tourists 
¾ January 2008:  Killed two Belgian tourists. 
¾ March 2008:  U.S. Embassy attack; killing a school guard in an adjacent building.  
¾ March 2008:  Attacks on energy sector. 
¾ Successive attacks on police headquarters in Sayoun, killing one policeman and 
wounding 17 others in July 2008. 
¾ August/September 2008:  Attacks on US Embassy, 16 killed 
¾ March 2009:  Four South Korean tourists killed and subsequent attack on investigating 
delegation  
¾ August 2009 assassination attempt on Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, Saudi Arabia's top 
counterterrorism official 
 
In February 2006, 23 al Qaida detainees tunneled out of prison.  These escapees included Jamal 
Ahmad Badawi and Jaber al Banna, two of the most prominent al Qaida operatives in Yemen.  
Al Badawi had been a principal organizer of the Cole bombing.  Subsequently, all but three of 
those who escaped have either been killed, recaptured, or surrendered.  The case of al Badawi 
has been a running sore between Sana’a and Washington.  He turned himself in to the Yemeni 
government in 2007 and promised to cooperate with authorities.  Claiming that the Yemen 
constitution does not permit extradition, Sana’a essentially has allowed al Badawi free rein.  Of 
these three still at large, Nassar al Wahishi and Qasim al Raimi have been the most significant.  
Al Wahishi became the chief of al Qaida in Yemen. 
 
The formation of al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula was announced in January 2009, 
representing a merger of the Yemeni and Saudi al Qaida branches.  The leader of the group is al 
Wahishi, with the second in command Qasim al Raimi, who reportedly was a principal target of 
the first December 2009 raid, but who escaped.  The Yemen government has suggested that al 
Wahishi and perhaps al Raimi were killed in the second raid, but as of the time of this writing, 
this has not been confirmed. 
 
The Yemen government’s response to al Qaida has been somewhat mixed over time.  Previous 
detentions without trial for terrorist suspects were common, but it is far from clear that the right 
persons were detained.  As noted earlier, even with detentions or convictions, actually holding 
prisoners was not particularly successful.  Besides the high-profile escapes, the government also 
released a number of others “for good behavior.”  Nevertheless, al Qaida has faced a number of 
pressures from both the US and the Yemen government.  In 2002, a CIA drone attack killed 
leader of al Qaida in Yemen abu Ali al Harthi.  In late 2003, his replacement Muhammed Hamdi 
al Ahdal was arrested by Yemeni government.  More recently, in July 2009 a Yemeni court 
sentenced 16 militants for attacks on the US Embassy and on the Belgian tourists; six were 
sentenced to death and the others imprisoned.  The Yemenis also have begun a terrorist 
rehabilitation program akin to the ongoing Saudi program.  It is too early to judge this program; 
an earlier variant was not well-resourced and had rather poor results. 
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The Houthi Rebellion 
 
The Houthi (also transliterated as Huthi) uprising reportedly began as quasi-police operation to 
arrest a former parliament member, Husein al-Houthi.  Although Husein al Houthi was killed 
early in the fighting, the struggle continued under the leadership of his relatives.  From its 
inception, the Houthi claimed to be defending Zaidi Islam from a hostile Yemeni government, 
claiming that Sana’a was increasingly falling under the influence of Salafis.  Also (and perhaps 
more importantly), it likely represents a clan/tribal attempt to preserve traditional power 
structures in the area.  The fighting has centered in Saada Province in northwestern Yemen, but 
some operations have expanded beyond this area.1 
 
Ideologically, the Houthi movement is very difficult to nail down.  In large measure, this is 
deliberate:  “In a July 2008 interview, al-Houthi explained that he and his supporters refused to 
articulate any kind of political agenda because doing so would cause people to start fighting to 
see such demands satisfied -- contradicting what he sees as the reactive dimension of the war.”2  
Although some of the rhetoric among some members of the rebellion is very militant – death to 
the US, death to Israel, etc., and the Houthi have condemned US activities in Yemen – there have 
been few if any indications thus far that they have any particular ties or sympathies with al 
Qaida.  This of course has not stopped the Yemen or Saudi governments from trying to argue 
that the Houthi are aligned with al Qaida. 
 
 One observer argued that there are four components to the insurgents: 
 
¾ a minority (Believing Youth) with a clear ideology and who maintain political ties with 
Iran 
¾ a small  percentage seeking to defend Zaidi identity 
¾ groups of armed men with purely financial motivations  
¾ a majority of tribesmen defending their families and villages3 
 
Fighting began in 2003-2004.  It has been marked by a series of battles, ceasefires and 
negotiations, followed by more fighting.  Some areas have remained under consistent rebel 
control.  Beyond the government-rebel fighting, the unrest has brought in some elements of tribal 
feuds, with for example the Hashid tribal federation fighting on the side of the government and 
the Bakil confederation supporting the rebels.  The fighting has resulted in considerable 
destruction in its wake.  In part, this has been a result of the use of heavy weapons by the 
government.  For their part, the rebels have engaged in widespread use of looting.  According to 
one source, in the areas of fighting,  7,180 houses, 1,412 farms, 267 mosques, 94 schools, eight 
medical centers, four police stations, three court buildings, three other government facilities and 
                                                 
r 
1 For details of the origins of the conflict, see International Crisis Group, Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb 
Middle East Report Number 86, 27 May 2009, pp. 2-5. 
2 Joost R. Hiltermann, “Disorder on the Border: Saudi Arabia’s War Inside Yemen”, Foreign Affairs Online 
at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65730/joost-r-hiltermann/disorder-on-the-borde
3 ICG, p. 5. 
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two religious centers had been destroyed in the fighting or by air bombardments.  It also has 
resulted in at least 150,000 displaced persons.4 
 
The situation with the Houthi rebellion became even more complicated on 5 November 2009.  A 
reported Houthi attack on a Saudi border post that killed a border guard led to a major Saudi 
response.    The Houthi have claimed that the Saudis have launched over 160 missiles against 
northern areas.  Although specific operations are difficult to establish conclusively, independent 
reporters in the area have confirmed significant Saudi air and ground operations.  The Saudi 
government has acknowledged suffering 73 killed and 26 missing to date in the fighting.5  The 
Houthi have claimed to have captured at least nine Saudi troops. 
 
 A major ongoing controversy in open sources is whether the Houthi are receiving practical 
support from Iran.  Middle East media have claimed that the Houthi have received training and 
some equipment from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and there have been allegations of 
Iranian shipments of weapons to the group via Iranian ships.6  Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu 
Bakr al-Qirbi recently stated that there are “indications” the rebels are getting support from 
religious groups in Iran and Shiite organizations in Arab countries and Europe.  He said that, 
“Once the evidence mounts and it is made public, then I am sure Iran will rethink its position 
because they know the implications of it. Everybody will understand the danger of such a role.”7 
 
If there is debate about Iranian covert support to the Houthi, Tehran has been very vocal on its 
diplomatic and propaganda efforts to signal its interest in the situation.  Iranian Foreign Minister 
Manouchehr Mottaki warned that certain regional states seek to foment discord between the 
Yemeni government and its people by fueling violence.  The Iranian government also has offered 
to “mediate” the dispute.  Iranian official press has maintained a steady stream of propaganda in 
support of the Houthi, together with trying to tie the US directly to attacks against the area (given 
the Saudi use of US-made aircraft in their air strikes, this particular propaganda theme may 
resonate well in the area).8 
 
As mentioned earlier, fighting between the government and the Houthi has been interspersed 
with negotiations.  A number of approaches have been used.  These have included indigenous 
mediation committees, building on traditional models, and the use of religious and local 
mediators.  One recurring issue has been the apparent lack of coordination between the Yemeni 
military and government mediators; in some cases, mediators have had to postpone their efforts 
due to fresh military offensives.9 The government also has paid ‘compensation’ to tribal leaders 
associated with the Houthi, together with a series of amnesties.  Although most efforts have been 
local, Qatar also has made significant efforts in pushing negotiations. 
 
  
                                                 
4 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Yemen – Sa’ada Emergency Situation 
Report #4, 08 September 2009”. 
5 Associated Press, “Weeks of Fighting Yemen Rebels Killed 73 Saudis”, 22 December 2009. 
6 For example, see Paul Salem, “Avoid the Trap of Escalation in Yemen”, Al Hayat, 26 November 2009. 
7 Tony Czuczka and Henry Meyer, “Yemen Sees ‘Mounting Evidence’ Iran Is Arming Rebels”, Bloomberg, 25 
November 2009. 
8 For Iranian reports of the fighting, see http://www.presstv.ir 
9 For details, see ICG, pp. 19-25. 
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Southern Unrest 
 
The third area of internal unrest is in Aden, the former capital of South Yemen.  Significant 
demonstrations and riots have erupted since May 2007.  Both internal security forces and army 
troops have been used to quell unrest, with a number of demonstrators killed.  Local political 
grievances have included job discrimination, equal rights, and purported punitive discharge of 
former South Yemen officers who putatively were covered by earlier amnesties.  As the unrest 
has continued, there have been increasing calls for the “liberation of south.” 
 
Much of the unrest has stemmed from issues still unresolved from the 1990 unification and the 
1994 civil war.  Sana’a replaced many of the former southern leaders with northern officials.  
According to Human Rights Watch, some 100,000 retired southern military officers and civil 
servants only sporadically receive their pensions, with “suspensions of pensions often appearing 
to be politically motivated, occurring after the individual participated in a political protest.”10  
There also have been repeated charges that northerners close to the government have received 
preferential treatment on land and oil contracts in the south. 
 
The first organized opposition movement in the south was the Society of Retired Military 
Officers, formed in 2007 and which organized protests.  These marches and sit-ins were met with 
violence and widespread arrests.11  These protests quickly broadened, incorporating many 
elements of southern society who felt marginalized by the north.  The Yemeni Socialist Party, 
the main political party representing southern interests, was a significant mobilization agent for 
spreading the movement, which has become known as the Southern Movement or Movement of 
the South.  Although there is a putative “Council for the Leadership of the Peaceful Revolution 
of the South”, this leadership council reportedly has little direct control over the large number of 
groups involved.12  As the protests have escalated, so have the demands, with many southerners 
now calling for independence. 
 
Most violence involving the protests thus far has been on the part of government security forces, 
but there has been scattered violence attributed to supporters of the Southern Movement.  In most 
cases, opposition violence has consisted of isolated rock-throwing, Molotov cocktails, and the 
like, but there have been a few murders and attacks attributed to its supporters.  Thus far, the 
unrest has been more political than violent, but the comments by one retired colonel in the 
Southern Movement may be representative of many in the south:  “There will be war when the 
money runs out.  President Saleh is a clever man – he knows how to play the tribes off one 





                                                 
10 Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government’s Brutal Response to Southern Movement 
Protests, New York, 2009, pp. 12-13. 
11 For details on governmental responses, see Human Rights Watch. 
12 HRW, p. 16. 
13 Michael Horton, “Why Southern Yemen is Pushing for Secession”, The Christian Science Monitor, 15 December 
2009. 
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Political Background 
 
Although now largely forgotten by most Western analysts, the 1962-1970 Civil War between the 
Republicans and Royalists in North Yemen emerged as one of the major regional conflicts, 
drawing in Egypt on the side of the Republicans and Saudi Arabia and Jordan on the side of the 
Royalists.  The Egyptians committed up to 70,000 troops and took significant casualties.  The 
Saudis tended to work much more behind the scenes, with minimal direct troop commitments, 
but were very active in other forms of support for their Royalist allies.  The end of the war 
provided indicators of processes still existing in Yemen.  Negotiations largely involved 
‘satisficing’, with virtually all the major players on each side receiving some level of reward, 
either politically, financially, or both.  Many of the issues driving the conflict essentially were 
finessed and continued to fester. 
  
Yemen as a ‘unified’ country is even more recent.  It was not until 1990 that the Marxist-led 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and the Republic of Yemen (North 
Yemen) merged into one state.  Politics in South Yemen had been particularly convoluted; the 
two insurgent groups that had fought against British in Aden – the Front for the Liberation of 
Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and the National Liberation Front (NLF) – fought against each 
other after British withdrawal.  The NLF won the struggle and took control of the new 
government in the south.  It took some 18 years after an agreement in principle between the two 
Yemens, and flare ups in fighting in South Yemen in 1979 and 1986, for unification to come to 
fruition.  Even then, in 1994 a civil war erupted between the north and south.  Most of the 
fighting took place in the south.  Although there was significant combat, Southern resistance 
collapsed rather quickly.  Importantly for today’s political climate, there were widespread, 
although incomplete, amnesties promised to the southern secessionist leaders. 
 
The government of Yemen did not help its own cause by tilting toward Iraq in the lead up to the 
Gulf War.  Saudi Arabia and other Arab supporters of the coalition forced at least 850,000 
Yemeni expatriates home, further stressing the economy.  Although Sana’a largely has 
reconciled with Riyadh since then, the results clearly set some limits on Sana’a’s freedom of 
action in foreign affairs. 
 
Saleh, who was first elected in 1978, continues to be elected President, almost always with a 
lopsided vote, together with his General People’s Congress.  The lopsided political system 
suggests a sham democracy such as is common in the Middle East, but official outside inspection 
observers have held that the elections generally have been “open and genuine”.14 President Saleh 
is required constitutionally to step down in 2013; even if he were to want to try to change the 
constitution to run again, his age virtually ensures succession in the relatively near future.  All 
this further complicates the regime’s political stability because of already emerging stresses over 
leadership succession between over whether Saleh’s son will continue the family business or 
whether other key players in the regime will replace him. 
 
                                                 
14 Yemen: Final Report. Presidential and Local Council Elections (European Union Election Observation Mission, 
September 2006), www.eueom-ye.org.    Despite this overall positive finding, the EU observers noted that there was 
unfair use of state resources, together with bias by the state media, detention of opposition supporters, and problems 
in the ballot counting process.   
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In terms of regional issues, HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are legal organizations in 
Yemen and conduct fund raising there.  HAMAS has formal offices in Yemen, and Yemeni 
governmental officials have participated in various ceremonies in support of the group.  There 
also have been reports of camps in Yemen for Gaza fighters. 
 
The Religious Component 
 
Yemen divided into two major religious branches, the Shia Zaidi sect primarily followed in the 
North and Northwest and the Shafa’i school of Sunni Islam mostly in the South and Southeast.  
The Zaidi historically were ruled under theocratic leaders.  Both schools of Islam historically 
have been generally moderate.  As Ali al-Anissi, head of the Bureau of National Security stated 
with some justification: “Zaidism is a Shiite strain within Sunni Islam, and Shafaism is a Sunni 
strain within Shiite Islam”.15  As a note in viewing the complications involved, President Saleh 
himself is a Zaidi. 
 
One potentially important change to this balance in recent years has been inroads made by 
Salafism, particularly in southern and eastern Yemen.  Wahabbis from Saudi Arabia have been 
increasingly active, and Salafi local ulema have been more vocal.  A key question for Western 
observers has been the role of al Iman University in Sana’a.  This has been portrayed (primarily 
by locals) as solely an institution of Islamic higher learning.  A number of outside observers have 
charged al Iman as being akin to a terrorist ideological training camp.  This view has been 
supported by the history of some of its alumni such as John Walker Lindh and a number of other 
foreign students who were subsequently arrested.  The university also has been very reluctant to 
open itself to outside observers.  President Saleh has publicly defended the school and has 
spoken there.  As Gregory D. Johnsen has argued, the reality probably is somewhere in between 
the two arguments, with al Iman continuing “to straddle this divide as a legitimate religious 
institution and as a fundamentalist pipeline.”16 
 
Al Iman University is headed by Sheik Abdulmajid al Zindani (or Zandani) who is designated as 
a terrorist financier by the UN's 1267 committee and as a spiritual advisor to bin Laden by the 
US Treasury.  He also is head of the Islah Party, a party in on-again, off-again opposition to the 
regime.17  In the convoluted world of Yemeni politics, however, Zindani reportedly is an ally of 
President Saleh, and focuses his main opposition to secular and socialist movements.  Zindani 
also has condemned separatist movements in Yemen; blaming them on a “foreign conspiracy”, 
he has stressed the need both for the unity of Yemen and for allegiance to the regime.18  Exactly 
how much influence he actually exerts on the regime is debated, but is cause of concern.  It also 
should be noted, however, that although Zindani is the most prominent Salafi scholar in Yemen, 
the group of Salafi ulema certainly is not unitary, and there is significant variation as to their 
level of regime support. 
                                                 
15 ICG, p. 8. 
16 Gregory D. Johnsen, “Yemen's Al-Iman University: A Pipeline for Fundamentalists?”, Terrorism Monitor 4/22, 
Jamestown Foundation, 16 November 2006.  
17 For a detailed examination of Islah’s relations with the government, see Amr Hamzawy, Between Government 
and Opposition:  The Case of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, Carnegie Papers, (Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, November 2009). 
18 Nasser Arrabyee, “Foreign Conspiracy Behind Yemen’s Unrest, Zandani”, 27 May 2009, at http://narrabyee-
e.blogspot.com/2009/05/foreign-conspiracy-behind-yemens-unrest.html. 
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Social and Economic Issues 
 
Beyond the purely security issues, Yemen faces a host of broader problems.  Perhaps the most 
salient is tribalism, which still exerts tremendous impact throughout much of Yemen.  The 
country is marked by significant poverty, with a per capita income of about $723.  The literacy 
rate is very low.  Large areas are sparsely inhabited, potentially providing multiple safe areas for 
bad actors.  Both oil and water resources are dwindling.19  Interspersed with all these other issues 
is the virtually endemic use of qat, a mildly narcotic drug.  Trying to assess the direct impact of 
qat use on other social and economic problems is virtually impossible, but any visitor to Sana’a 
would note how much of the male population essentially shuts things down in the afternoon to 
enjoy their chew. 
 
Regionally, Yemen also has faced human trafficking from Somalia, and – perhaps desperation 
overtaking forethought – significant refugee flows from Somalia.  According to the UNHCR, as 
of September 2009, there were over 153,000 registered Somali refugees in Yemen, and the rate 
of inflow has been increasing in recent months.20  Yemen also traditionally has been a gateway 
for arms and drug smuggling, and this is unlikely to change.  One analyst has claimed that 
Yemen has 60 million weapons for a population of 22 million people.21  Piracy in the Gulf also 
has impacted trade in and out of Yemen. 
 
Strategic ‘Boxes’ for the Government of Yemen 
 
Given limited resources, Yemen faces somewhat of a Rubik’s Cube in reacting to its three major 
internal security threats.   Some broader initiatives – such as improved governance, lowering 
corruption, and improving economic conditions – can significantly address many of the issues 
driving internal unrest.  However, the level of attention and resources devoted to each of major 
threats must be prioritized by the Yemeni government.  Viewing it from Sana’a’s perspective, 
the following factors probably impact on allocating resources for the three major internal 
security threats. 
 




¾ Under intense pressure from Western countries & Saudi Arabia to deal with al Qaida. 
¾ Increased foreign assistance. 
¾ Al Qaida operations can impact investments and tourism. 
¾ Remove additional source of instability. 
 
 
                                                 
19 For a good overview of the major issues facing Yemen, see Christopher Boucek, Yemen: Avoiding a Downward 
Spiral, Carnegie Papers, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September2009). 
20 http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=86830 
21 Shari Villarosa, Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Conference “Al-Qaeda in Yemen”, 
7 July 2009. 
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Negatives 
 
¾ Some level of popular support (and potentially, support within elements of the 
government) for al Qaida. 
¾ Thus far, minimal direct attacks on government. 
¾ Distraction from more direct challenges to government legitimacy. 
¾ Success could perversely impact Saudi Arabia by movements of al Qaida members back 
into Saudi Arabia. 
 




¾ Reduces major direct armed challenge to government. 
¾ Improves government control over border. 
¾ Reduces impetus for Saudi direct involvement in Yemen. 
¾ Can impact potential other tribal unrest. 




¾ Likely to be militarily costly. 
¾ Can upset tribal balance. 
¾ Geographically not central to country. 
¾ Military operations are creating increased resistance. 
 




¾ Still a possibility for resolution through political means. 
¾ Aden important economic resource. 




¾ Underlying grievances may be difficult to resolve. 
¾ Resolving grievances could be economically costly. 
¾ Unrest appears to be getting stronger. 
 
The US-Yemen Minuet 
 
Yemen-US relations over the last few years probably could be best described as prickly.  
Although generally reasonably cooperative, a number of issues have surfaced between the two 
countries.  From Yemen’s standpoint, many of the grievances have stemmed from what it has 
perceived as inconsistent US support, particularly financially.  The US essentially ended the 
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USAID program in Yemen in mid-1990’s, and did not re-open a USAID mission in Yemen until 
2003.  Even after 2003, funding remained inconsistent.  In November 2005, for instance, the US 
government told Saleh who was in the US at the time that Yemen had been suspended from the 
USAID Program due to governmental corruption; the timing and manner of this notification had 
to be humiliating. 
 
In recent years, US military assistance to Yemen has yo-yoed significantly.  According to 
Congressional Research Service figures, in FY 2006, Department of Defense 1206 assistance to 
Yemen was $4.3 million; in FY 2007, $ 26 million; no 1206 assistance in FY 2008; and $66.8 
million in FY 2009.22  Likewise, non-military assistance also has increased significantly.  
According to open sources, US training efforts within Yemen for counterterrorism operations 
also have become more intense.  Together with the US, the United Kingdom also is providing 
significant support and financial assistance.23 
 
In part, the variation in assistance has been the result of general governmental corruption, but in 
large measure it has resulted from US perceptions that the Yemen government has been less than 
cooperative on counterterrorism, particularly focused on al Qaida.  Given the recent operations, 
this may be changing to at least some degree.  At the same time, though, cooperation likely will 
remain subject to considerable stresses.  A significant segment of the Yemeni population – and 
some members of the Yemen government and security services – view any problems 
experienced by the country as being due to foreign interference.  Conspiratorial threads seem to 
be engrained in much of society and will likely always provide roadblocks.  Likewise, some of al 
Qaida’s rhetoric probably resonates well in a very stressed society such as Yemen’s. 
 
The other aspect of cooperation almost certainly will involve Sana’a trying to ‘sell’ al Qaida 
involvement in the other two security threats.  There already have been statements by Yemen 
government officials suggesting (usually vague) connections with the Houthi and the Southern 
Movement.  From the government’s perspective, this approach makes sense in garnering foreign 
support for their efforts.  Thus far, at least, such warnings seem to be largely bogus, particularly 
given the very different agendas of the various groups. 
 
The issue becomes one of self-fulfilling prophecies.  Some of these linkages might in fact be 
developing.  According to al Jazeera reporting, suspected al Qaida commanders addressed a rally 
in southern Yemen, condemning the December raids; members of the Southern Movement 
reportedly participated in the rally.  Two factors could increase the prospects of actual 
cooperation.  The first is a series of Yemeni security operations that kill a significant number of 
civilians in areas that straddle the main zones of current conflict.  The second would be too 
heavy a foreign footprint in Yemeni operations. 
 
Yemen will likely continue to be a difficult partner in counterterrorism efforts.  Although there 
clearly are some common interests, the strategic contexts will remain different.  Sana’a will 
continue to focus on what it views as its major internal threats.  Trying to decipher what is in fact 
                                                 
22 Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, 7 July 2009, p. 15. 
23 The British have not released monetary figures for their military assistance, but according to “DFID Yemen: Our 
Current Program”, the civilian and humanitarian programs totaled 12 million pounds in 2007-2008, and 20 million 
pounds in 2008-2009, with expansion planned for the future.  
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the strategic calculus of the Yemen government in a very complicated internal environment is 
critical for long-term stability. 
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Relations, Naval Postgraduate School.  He has worked in over 25 countries with this program in 
national counterterrorism strategy development.  He is a retired Military Intelligence officer and 
Middle East Foreign Area Officer, with service in Lebanon, El Salvador, Desert Storm, Somalia, 
and OIF.
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